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ABSTRACT 
 
THE SIMULACRUM SURFACED: 
A STUDY ON THE NATURE OF THE IMAGE 
 
 
Evren Erlevent 
M.F.A. in Graphic Design 
 
 Principal Advisor: Assist. Prof Andreas Treske 
Co-Advisor: Zafer Aracagök 
June, 2004 
 
This study aims at understanding the nature of the 
visual image through discussing the notion of 
'simulacrum' within the philosophy of Plato, 
Baudrillard and Deleuze and trying to locate its 
importance within the representational system of 
models and copies. The notion of imitation and 
representation is found problematic in explaining 
the fascination within visual imagery and Deleuze’s 
term ‘becoming’ is suggested as more appropriate. It 
is discussed in this thesis how the simulacrum 
threatens and destabilizes model/copy relations of 
representation through its role in Deleuze’s 
‘sensation.’ 
 
 
Key Words: Simulacrum, Simulacra, Image, 
Representation, Visual Arts 
iv 
 
 
  
                           
 
ÖZET 
 
YÜZEYE ÇIKAN SİMÜLAKRUM: 
İMGENİN DOĞASI ÜZERİNE BİR ARAŞTIRMA 
 
 
Evren Erlevent 
Grafik Tasarım Bölümü Yüksek Lisans 
 
Tez Yöneticisi: Assist. Prof. Andreas Treske 
Yardımcı Yönetici: Zafer Aracagök 
Haziran, 2004 
 
 
Bu tezin amacı görsel imajın doğasını, Plato, 
Baudrillard ve Deleuze’un ‘simülakrum’ üzerindeki 
görüşlerine yer vererek anlamaya çalışmaktır. 
Temsili sistemin öğeleri; model ve kopya 
incelenerek, simülakrumun bu ilişki içindeki yeri 
tespit edilmeye çalışılmaktadır. Taklit ve temsil 
kavramlarının görsel sanat eserlerinin yarattığı 
büyüleyici etkiyi açıklamakta yetersiz kaldığı 
tartışılmakta ve Deleuze’un “oluş/başkalaşış” 
kavramı önerilmektedir. Bu tezde simülakrumun 
temsili sistemi nasıl tehdit ettiği ve model/kopya 
ilişkilerini Deleuze’un ‘duyusal’ kavramındaki 
rolüyle dayanaksız kıldığı  tartışılmaktadır. 
 
Anahtar Sözcükler: Simülakrum, Simülakra, Suret, 
İmaj, İmge, Temsil, Görsel Sanatlar 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. THE AIM AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
This study aims to understand the peculiar nature of 
the image and its processes. What is it that ‘works’ in 
representation? Is there always some form of imitation, 
or a model to copy? How is the whole model – copy 
relation established and what is simulacra’s role 
within this relation? Does the simulacrum have anything 
to do with the timeless, captivating power in images 
that cannot be explained with sign/signified systems? 
 
These seemingly simple questions prove to have complex 
and strongly opposing answers within philosophy, 
cultural theory and philosophy of art. Since ancient 
Greece, the argument of the simulacrum has tended to 
either the absolute approval of all forms, arts and 
spectacles or the complete condemnation and hatred of 
any kind of appearance as imposture. While the fervour 
of most of these ideas force us to decide between 
simulacrum as simply good or bad, together with the 
enormous explosion of imagery since the 60’s, texts 
that deal with the matter in depth have been written, 
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further complicating the for and against attitudes 
towards the simulacrum. 
 
As shall be seen, there are good reasons to believe 
that the simulacrum is the key to comprehending the 
ways of the image as well as anything that has not been 
established in any side of a strict duality, or as a 
way to deconstruct established meanings through art. 
Although simulacra could be thought to envelope every 
possible term that implies any kind of instability, 
ambiguity, un-decidability, two-naturedness or paradox; 
such as madness, ecstasy, gibberish, noise, bi-
sexuality, or phantasms, these aspects are left out (or 
at least are tried to) in this study for the sake of 
producing a coherent whole that concentrates on 
visuality and the image.  
 
For the reason that the argument on simulacrum is one 
made in the territory of the Idea and the copy, it is 
directly related to the fields of ontology, art, 
technology, philosophy of art with an emphasis on 
representation and issues of subjectivity. At times it 
will be difficult to smoothly correlate these various 
fields because of the differences in jargon, yet it is 
impossible to consider one without the other. 
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Throughout this text, I will be trying to summarize a 
number of philosopher’s views related to the 
simulacrum. Starting with Plato and moving on to the 
more socially concerned Baudrillard, I will proceed 
with the more artistically interested; Deleuze and 
Durham. Especially Deleuze's notion of simulacrum and 
its consequences within visual arts are important to 
this thesis. Other philosophers and authors such as 
Derrida, Klossowski and Nietzsche will be referred to 
at certain points where Deleuze refers to or leaves 
unmentioned, further allowing me to analyze the 
relations between the model and the copy which holds a 
crucial role in understanding the importance of the 
simulacrum. Last of all I will discuss the simulacrum 
and its role through artworks and present my 
conclusion. 
 
I have felt strongly at times that there is yet a lot 
more to learn, and even learn better and unlearn, from 
Heidegger, Derrida and Lacoue-Labarthe. I do not have 
the required philosophical background to dwell in these 
issues at large nor the time to read all the material -
which is rather inhumanely immense anyway- that may 
have been use to this thesis. 
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1.2. IMAGE AND THE PROBLEM OF REPRESENTATION 
 
"Matter, in our view, is an aggregate of 
images. And by image we mean a certain 
existence which is more than what the 
idealist calls a representation, but less 
than that which the realist calls a 
thing, an existence placed half-way 
between the thing and the 
representation"(Bergson, 9). 
 
The very special condition of being an image, whether a 
realistic sculpture, film, mental picture, thought or 
metaphor, lies in its position of being “placed half-
way between the thing and the representation”, as 
Bergson puts it. In other words, an image can never be 
a total thing in itself and also cannot be the thing it 
mimes to be. 
 
The earliest known theory of art in Western Philosophy 
belongs to Plato (B.C. 427-347) who has condemned all 
visual artists, dramatists, most poets and musicians 
for operating imitatively. In Republic, his main 
concern seems to be that these artists, through the act 
of imitating people and things that they are not in 
reality, arise highly complex and strong emotions in 
the viewers/audience that have the power of 
destabilizing them, which is dangerous to his Ideal  
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State and good sense in general. Plato’s understanding 
of visual arts as a mirror held to nature, is dominant 
in Western society until the 20th century. According to 
Plato, art simulates appearances. It shall be 
discussed, that although, together with political, 
economical and social changes the understanding and 
appreciation of things gathered under the name ‘art’ 
have changed in the recent centuries, Plato’s notion of 
art as imitative, mimetic or figurative has become 
problematical, yet remained. In 1747, Batteux, in his 
attempt to classify the Fine Arts, wrote in The Fine 
Arts Reduced To A Single Principle;  
“We will define painting, sculpture and 
dance as the imitation of beautiful 
nature conveyed through colours, through 
relief and through attitudes. And music 
and poetry are the imitation of beautiful 
nature conveyed through sounds, or 
through measured discourse” (qtd. Carroll 
22). 
 
Batteux’s single proposed founding principle of fine 
arts, as conceived in the 18th century, is that it 
‘imitates’ beautiful nature. Only a century after the 
ultimate task and motivation of fine arts was defined 
by Batteux as such, (as the long term result of trying 
to precisely imitate a country view in fog, the myth 
says), Monet and his friends would open up a 
possibility in the visual field of art and give way to 
what we now claim to be a landmark in art history; the  
 6
Parisian des Refuses Exhibition in 1863. As we shall 
see later in Deleuze, it is not correct that the 
Impressionists, or Realists before them, invented a new 
meaning for art, rather, their paintings made it clear 
that the effect art has on us, or the way it works, is 
and had always been more than simply imitating 
beautiful nature. In the case of the Impressionists, 
they were strictly still imitating beautiful nature in 
the sense that they were consciously trying to imitate 
the effect or impression that beautiful nature has on 
us through painting. The Platonic understanding of art 
as imitation still seemed to be valid at this point, 
but as Modernism moved on it encountered fatally 
serious threats; Toulouse-Lautrec’s extreme 
stylizations, Cézanne’s landscapes, Picasso and 
Braque’s first collages using real wood imitation 
wallpaper, all pointed to the direction of bringing out 
the surface of the painting and showing the material a 
visual image is made of, thus moving away from 
figuration and imitation and also introducing (as the 
Impressionists introduced the already existing 
impression or effect) an intellectual aspect of the 
arts; whether it be socially, culturally or yet again 
artistically concerned. It was also questioned by this 
time whether music was really imitative or not, or 
whether architecture imitated anything at all. 
Duchamp’s ready-mades or Rothko’s colour-field  
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paintings are the extremes points of Modernism in which 
it seems that figuration or imitation has come to its 
end. 
 
“Today, after almost a century of 
abstract painting, [Plato’s] theory seems 
obviously false. […] Art history has 
shown us that the theory of art 
associated with Plato is too exclusive; 
it confronts too many exceptions; it 
fails to count as art everything that we 
regard as belonging to the category of 
art” (Carroll 21). 
 
It is rather obvious that the modernists have shown us 
that art is not about mere imitation. Representation 
has took the place of imitation and with the 
introduction of semiotics, it has become generally 
accepted that an artwork, like a word, is a 
representation of something understood as such. With 
this definition, images have the right to exist at 
least, but only on the condition of referring to 
something else. It is a generally acclaimed notion 
today that the visual image stands for something else 
and if it is not successful in doing so, it succumbs to 
represent and becomes nonsense. Something has to be 
found to make the indexical image meaningful, this is 
usually a word, a name, or if the artwork is complex, a 
sentence. The main problem with Plato’s understanding 
of art as imitation was not so much that the artwork 
might be mistaken as real, but the strict indexical  
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relationship of the work to its model that fails in 
explaining the fascination one experiences through art. 
The index value remains, this is why art as 
representation does not bring a new understanding and 
is no different than seeing the image as imitation. 
This could be likened to Nietzsche’s notion of the 
death of God in Thus Spoke Zarathustra; the deaths of 
God is meaningless if we do away with God as an outer 
referent and keep the place embodied within. Such is 
the relation of imitation to representation; the place 
is kept. Furthermore, although the limits may be 
forced, it is obviously true that art does resemble and 
is related with forms, figures and in general, appears 
to be imitating something else. The problem of 
imitation in visual arts is not an easy one to prove 
false through a few problematic counter-examples. All 
appearances have their basis in this duality, thus a 
more radical approach is needed to claim imitation 
wrong. 
 
Appearances are thought to fall in two main categories: 
copies and simulacra. To make a quick and very broad 
definition in a way that most of the philosophers 
mentioned in this text would not disagree; simulacra is 
a copy that does not totally function as a copy does, 
it is said to not have a model. 
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1.3. SIMULACRUM: ETYMOLOGY 
 
“If the term ‘simulacrum’ has become a 
key word, even a slogan, in discussions 
of culture after modernism, it is because 
it would seem to authorize the critic to 
relate the disparate elements of that 
culture as so many instances of a single 
aesthetics and interpretive problem; that 
of the image which, having internalized 
its own repetition, calls into question 
the authority and legitimacy of its 
model. In this sense, the simulacrum 
appears as the privileged form through 
which something like a “postmodern 
experience” might be imagined” (Durham 
3). 
 
Although the word ‘simulacrum’ has been the centre of 
attention in describing and theorizing postmodernism, 
as Scott Durham tells us in Phantom Communities, The 
word 'simulacrum' (likeness, image, statue) has its 
etymology in the Latin word “'simulare' (simulate, 
copy, imitate, look like) that is related to 'similis' 
(similar, like, resembling)”(“simulacrum” Def. 1a). 
“The word has entered English from French in the 14th 
century”, together with ‘image’, and is one that has 
increasingly been “used in a derogatory sense” 
(“simulacrum” Def. 1b). While in Latin the connotation 
was on the degree of ‘similarity’ of the copy to the 
model, and ‘especially solid form, statue’ has been 
noted in many dictionaries, it is possible to see from 
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the dictionary entries alone that the everyday usage of 
the word has increasingly drawn to emphasize 'fake', 
'false', 'pretend' or with the closest in everyday 
language: 'imposture.' Further etymologic studies show 
that the nuance between ‘image’ and ‘simulacrum’ seems 
to be that a simulacrum, although considered a sub-
category of image, is very precise, even life-like in 
copying and always in an act of resembling formal 
qualities as Taylor describes in Reading Pierre 
Klossowski. 
The word “simulacrum” is restricted by 
English usage to “a representation of 
something (image, effigy),” to “something 
having the form but not the substance of 
a material object (imitation, sham),” and 
to “a superficial likeness (appearance, 
semblance).” Contemporary French 
understands the term similarly, while 
maintaining traces of more concrete Latin 
meanings: “statue (of a pagan god),” even 
“phantom.” Interestingly, French adds “a 
simulated act” to these semantic 
possibilities: […]“he took his head in 
his hands and performed the futile 
simulacrum (fit le futile simulacre) of 
tearing it off.” For Roman writers, a 
simulacrum could also be “a material 
representation of ideas” (and not just 
that of a deity), as well as “a moral 
portrait.” 
 
It is a safe claim to say that Baudrillard's Simulacrum 
and Simulacra popularised the word in the early 80’s, 
leading most to think of the term as his buzz-word or 
produced in and for the television age. What more, it 
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is possible to come across ‘simulacrum’ in many 
American college and university level writings used to 
describe the false imagery within advertisements. The 
sense one gets of the simulacrum in this convention is 
always one of ‘imposture’ and always used within the 
context of mass-culture, especially television and 
advertisements.  
 
With the increasingly wide usage of the Internet, 
developments in virtual reality environments and 
sophisticated simulations (flight, rally, city...etc.) 
the words simulacra and simulation have increasingly 
been used and also understood as a technology related 
term, which is a neutral usage that also brings out the 
direct relation of the simulacrum to technology. 
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2. SIMULACRA AS SPECTACLE 
 
2.1. PLATO: IN THE CAVE 
 
“- Him who makes all the things that all 
handicraftsmen severally produce. 
- A truly clever and wondrous man you 
tell of! 
- Ah, but wait, and you will say so 
indeed, for this same handicraftsman is 
not only able to make all implements, but 
he produces all plants and animals, 
including himself, and thereto earth and 
heaven and the gods and all things in 
heaven and in Hades under the earth. 
- A most marvellous Sophist!” 
 
(Plato 821; Republic, Book X) 
 
Plato’s view of art, especially all kinds of visual art 
as imitation, is one that is preliminary to philosophy 
of art. As we have seen earlier, if we do not over-
simplify Plato’s views as being unable to encompass and 
explain modern artworks, the argument remains intact on 
the most part and cannot be overlooked in a study 
of/over representation. 
 
According to Plato, the everyday, world of matter and 
its components are not primary reality but a world of 
appearances that are the distorted reflections of a 
timeless and immaterial realm of 'Ideas' (also 
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translated as ‘forms’ and ‘universals’) that is 
knowable only by use of the intellect. In the famous 
cave allegory the physical world and its truth is 
likened to shadows cast on the wall of a cave. 
 
“Picture men dwelling n a sort of 
subterranean cavern with a long entrance 
open to the light on its entire width. 
Conceive them as having their legs and 
necks fettered [chained] from childhood, 
so that they remain in the same spot, 
able to look forward only, and prevented 
by the fetters [chains] from turning 
their heads. Picture further the light 
from a fire burning higher up and at a 
distance behind them, and between the 
fire and the prisoners and above them a 
road along which a low wall has been 
built, as the exhibitors of puppet shows 
have partitions before the men 
themselves, above which they show the 
puppets. [… ]See also, then, men carrying 
past the wall implements of all kinds 
that rise above the wall, and human 
images and shapes of animals as well, 
wrought in stone and wood and every 
material” (Plato 747: Republic, Book 
VII). 
 
Plato claims through the analogy that our world of 
sight is the underworld of shadows and the real objects 
in the Upperworld are the everlasting Ideas. Of course, 
only the philosopher is capable of striding outside the 
cave under the sun, seeing the real through Reason and 
it is his duty to return to the cave, the State and 
enlighten the blind also. There is a divorce between 
the rational/spiritual and the material aspects of 
human existence, one in which the material is devalued. 
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This hierarchical separation of Matter and Form, of 
Soul and Body, Reason and Desire or of Idea and Copy 
are the founding structure of Western thought. In other 
words, Plato’s dualism is the starting point of 
Metaphysics in which the Idea reins. This separation 
automatically implies a hierarchy and a lineage where 
some things are closer to the original than others. In 
Book III of Republic, Plato condemns all forms of 
visual arts, almost all musical instruments, any form 
of literature that does not use simple narration and 
also tragedy as mere imitations. Furthermore, imitating 
the slaves, madmen, horse or any other animal as well 
as the sound of the wind and a woman quarrelling with 
her husband should be strictly forbidden in the State. 
Any form of imitation is to be restricted, if it has to 
be at all it should be from youth upward with only one 
acceptable and worthy model; one hero for future heroes 
of the State, with the characters that are suitable to 
their profession; the brave, courageous, temperate, 
holy, free and the like. The painter is three times 
degraded from the truth; he is who works with and gives 
way to simulacra; the copies of copies. According to 
Plato, all imitative art not flourishing from reason 
appeals to the emotions, thus furthers us away from the 
pursuit of universal knowledge. Even worse, these 
copies of the copies have such extrinsic likeness that  
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the illiterate and small children might mistake it as 
being truthful, that is, a faithful copy to the Idea.  
 
Plato is not unaware that all things are not loyal to 
his system of Ideas, he is merely very economical and 
suggests it is wiser to simply condemn or avoid all 
things (of which are mostly done for the sake of 
pleasure) that will lead to confusion in his project of 
tracing down the Realm of Ideas onto the State of 
Reason. This attitude of avoiding is made explicit in 
most of his texts. For example, in Republic, he clearly 
states that although certain passages in Homer are 
dearly close to his heart, they are still imitation and 
must be away with. A most extreme example of Plato’s 
avoiding from Republic, is where he actually decides to 
put away with certain myths, even if they are true, in 
order to purify his principle notion that all divine 
things are good and can only lead to similarly good 
things . The extremity does not come from the irony of 
Plato actually telling/writing the stories to be 
condemned, for example “the doings of Themis and Zeus”, 
but that myths themselves are usually the founding 
structure and criteria of Plato’s selections (627; 
Republic, Book II).  
 
Plato further writes of the simulacrum in Philebus. 
There are two dimensions of things; one of which have  
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particular fixed qualities and measurable states, size 
or lengths, the other of pure becoming without measure. 
 
“Once you give definitive quantity to 
‘hotter’ and ‘colder’ they cease to be; 
‘hotter’ never stops where it is but is 
always going a point further, and the 
same applies to ‘colder’, whereas 
definite quantity is something that has 
stopped going on and is fixed. It follows 
therefore from what I say that ‘hotter’ , 
and its opposite with it, must be 
unlimited. ” (1101). 
 
Strangely enough, these things of which Plato says are 
in the category of “unlimited” things, combined with 
the measurable “finite” ones, bring out a third 
category (which he sometimes entitles “health” or the 
“source of all the delights of life”) is “that of the 
equal and double, and any other that puts and end to 
the conflict of opposites with one another, making them 
well proportioned and harmonious by the introduction of 
number” (1102; Philebus). In other words, things 
belonging to the mixed third category are ones that 
have tamed the unlimited. Although Plato does not state 
it overtly, the definition is one of art. He later 
introduces a fourth category that is the “cause” of the 
mixed third kind, and from there on ties it to reason, 
“glorifying his favorite god” again (1103-1105). 
 
In a very similar manner of proving most arts as being 
imitative, unreliable and untruthful, in Sophist Plato  
unmasks and hunts down the sophist. At this point it is 
important to better understand what Plato is trying to 
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do by unmasking and condemning. It has already been 
said that most art, together with any form of imitation 
in society, should be controlled so that it does not 
trigger or stir up intense emotions in the 
viewer/audience/subjects that could lead to 
instability. Similarly in the case of the sophist, he 
is such an instable character (so to speak) that there 
are a multitude of definitions needed to “track him 
down.” The sophist still has the power of escaping 
these definitions because he is not strictly tied to 
any form of “Upperworldy” notions such as truth, good 
or just. Although the sophist is not a faithful devotee 
of, for instance, the Truth, he is constantly 
performing the act of putting forth or bringing out 
certain statements, words and conclusions about the 
Truth that are by nature, necessarily; Upperworldy. 
What is being stated at the moment is actually very 
obvious; since analytically the only difference between 
a philosopher and a sophist is that the former strives 
for consistency while the later has scattered the 
necessary consistency to philosophize into small 
pieces, or to put it a different way; on the level of 
their character; a philosopher believes in what he is 
doing while a sophist only believes in order to do what 
he does. The sole existence of the sophist puts the  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 18
relation of the philosopher to the Truth in danger. 
What else is a philosopher than a devoted sophist? In 
this sense, a philosopher is a faithful copy to the 
original while a sophist is a simulacrum. It is the act 
of coming and going between the world of Ideas and of 
matter that Plato needed to restrict according to this 
loyalty, or else the Ideal State would never become a 
faithful copy of the perfect Realm of Ideas through 
instantaneous and personal experience, which is in 
itself already two fold and erratic. 
 
Plato does not rest after hunting down the sophist as a 
hunter, a trader and a warrior; his final movement is 
when he proves that the sophist is an imitator. 
 
“The art of contradiction making, 
descending from insincere kind of 
conceited mimicry, of the semblance-
making breed, derived from image making, 
distinguished as a portion, not divine 
but human, of production, that presents a 
shadow play of words ---such are the 
blood and lineage which can, with perfect 
truth, be assigned to the authentic 
sophist” (1016-17; Sophist). 
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2.2. BAUDRILLARD: SIMULATIONS 
 
“Whoever fakes an illness can simply stay 
in bed and make everyone believe he is 
ill. Whoever stimulates an illness 
produces in himself some symptoms” 
(Littré qtd. in Baudrillard, 3). 
 
Baudrillard, is no doubt, the first name that comes to 
mind today when one pronounces ‘simulacrum’ in public. 
The metaphysical, binary relations in Plato are intact 
in Baudrillard’s theory, but, as we shall see, in an 
entirely different way. As is apparent from his 
quotation from Littré in Simulacra and Simulation, 
Baudrillard observes that imitation (or representation) 
is extremely different than simulation. In the former, 
the reality principle remains, for example in the case 
of illness, one can objectively understand through 
science, medicine or examination if the patient is 
truly ill or not ill and only imitating to be. If the 
person claiming to be ill is a psychosomatic, then s/he 
has real symptoms of the illness and it is not possible 
to objectively say that s/he is ill or not ill or 
imitating to be ill. It is a paradoxical or hyperbolic 
situation; the patient is both ill and is not at the 
same time. If a symptom can be produced, writes 
Baudrillard, then symptoms can no longer be seen as 
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facts of nature and medicine loses its meaning. He also 
gives the example of Iconoclasts and says that they 
were the ones to understand simulacra as is; “forever 
radiant with their own fascination” (5). The reason why 
the Iconoclasts were so zealous, claims Baudrillard, 
was not their belief that the divine could not be 
represented but their fear that it can be. They knew 
that the simulated God would “deploy their power and 
pomp of fascination […] and efface God from the 
consciousness of men” (4). He argues that if the 
Iconoclasts had really believed that images were 
worthless attempts at representing the unrepresentable, 
there would have been no reason to destroy them. As is 
in the relation of simulated symptoms to the truth of 
medicine, the fascination of God icons would make 
apparent that God never existed, that he was never 
anything else but his own simulacrum. Images, when 
unmasked, dissimulate the fact that there is nothing 
behind them, they are therefore the murderers of the 
real, says Baudrillard; they murder their own model. 
 
However, he adds that all good Western faith opposed to 
this [dark] murderous power with a [bright] dialectical 
power; that of representation. If a sign could be 
exchanged for the depth of meaning (for simulation is a 
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always on the surface) then the reality principle could 
be obtained, the sign would be in second rank to the 
signified. The only thing that could guarantee such an 
exchange, claims Baudrillard, is God. The moment God is 
simulated, the whole system turns into a simulacrum. 
The principle of representation lies in the equivalence 
of the sign to the real, whereas the logic of 
simulation has its roots in the radical negation of 
sign as value. 
“Whereas representation tries to absorb 
simulation by interpreting it as a false 
representation, simulation envelops the 
whole edifice of representation as itself 
as a simulacrum. Such would be the 
successive phases of the image: 
 
 1. It is the reflection of a basic 
reality. 
 2. It masks and perverts a basic reality. 
 3. It masks the absence of a basic 
reality. 
4. It bears no relation to any reality 
whatever: it is its own pure simulacrum.” 
 
(Baudrillard 6) 
 
In the first case the image is ‘good’, it is 
representation in a sacramental order. The second is 
‘evil’, it is of the order of maleficence. The third 
‘plays’ in the order of sorcery and the last is mere 
simulacra that is no longer in the order of appearance 
(as the appearance of something else). Baudrillard 
categorizes the orders of simulacra in a similar 
successive fashion in another essay from Simulacra and 
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Simulation; Simulacra and Science Fiction. In the First 
Order of simulation, simulacra are ‘natural’ and 
founded on the image, in this phase, class mobility 
allows traditional reference systems to be swapped yet 
signs are still in reference to an original and tied to 
social relations of power. In the Second Order, 
simulacra are ‘productive’; Baudrillard claims that 
together with the Industrial Revolution, things 
counterfeit were able to do so in large quantities. 
Signs loose their qualities of being 
references/representations and become mere products. 
The Third Order is mere ‘simulation’, the cybernetic 
game, there is no longer a specific product or producer 
but only a set of codes (121-128). 
 
Baudrillard’s much-acclaimed article, “The Precession 
of Simulacra” begins with citing the Borges fable in 
which the cartographers of the Empire prepare a map 
that is equal in size to its territory.1 The allegory 
of simulation no longer reflects our situation, says 
Baudrillard, since the real/ territory has not survived 
the simulation/map. The shreds that are left in the 
desert to decay are those of the territory, not the 
map. In fact, says Baudrillard, the inversion of the 
analogy is not useful either since there no longer 
remains a sovereign difference between the map and the 
territory; the metaphysical, representative quality is 
totally lost. Today, the real is produced from  
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“miniaturized cells, matrices, and memory banks, models 
of control—and it can be reproduced an indefinite 
number of times from these models” (2). The process of 
simulation is a constant operation that has cut loose 
of any reference outside itself such as an ideal (good, 
truth, ethically correct…etc), it has nothing to 
measure itself against. “Our reality”, says 
Baudrillard, “is in fact no longer a reality at all 
given that we no longer have an imaginary to envelope 
our reality” (2). Baudrillard calls this new reality 
“hyperreal.” There is no longer a question of 
imitation, meaning or duplication, not even parody 
because the liquidated signs in this hyperreal only 
refer to other signs and can lend themselves to any 
system of binary opposition or equivalence. In short, 
in Baudrillard’s theory of simulation, humanity has 
reached the point in history where the machine of 
simulation has become full-operational and no longer 
needs its former model; the real. The real is now 
unable to produce itself and we are like the people in 
Borges’s fable that live on the map with no access to 
the territory.2 
I think it would be just to describe Baudrillard’s 
theory of simulation as a –near fatal- combination of 
technological fascination with Debord’s notions of the 
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Spectacle. Guy Debord showed in The Society of The 
Spectacle how the spectacle, “a social relation among 
people, mediated through images” (Chapter 1, par. 4), 
was the means that separated and isolated 
people/viewers only to connect them through itself. 
Debord claims that the spectacle is the opposite of the 
dialogue. In Baudrillard, there is the Real and there 
is what we live in, separated and joined by the 
spectacle which through our/its excessive act of 
simulation we/have turned into an inescapably huge 
television screen and prevented any kind of real 
contact whatsoever.  
 
The obvious objection to Baudrillard has been heard and 
told so many times; why is the emphasis on ‘today’, 
does this separation not exist in the very structure of 
language itself, what is so special about ‘now’? 
Another objection can be made on the level of what he 
so well categorises as the “successive phases of the 
image.” These should not be seen as successive phases, 
but true all at once of the image. The first three 
‘phases’ could be thought as only one, since an 
realistic portrait, for example, imitates the person 
(first stage), perverts the reality of the person 
through the act of imitating/referring to him/her 
(second stage) and can only refer to the person in 
his/her absence anyway (third). 
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There a variety of difficulties in reading Baudrillard; 
although he strives for a systematic and totalizing 
philosophy that encompasses everything, he obviously 
fails to do so and is highly contradictory at times. It 
is hard to approach him because of the ambiguity or 
indecision of some issues that are in fact crucial to 
his philosophy. For example, he uses the word ‘model’ 
interchangeably, while at times applying the Platonic 
sense of the word as the origin, the essence as when he 
uses it for the model of the real. In turns, the real 
is a model to the simulacrum and finally simulacra 
becomes models to and amongst themselves in 
Baudrillard. There is a logical fault in the whole 
process, by definition, the first model as essence, 
original, does not contain any form. If it does have a 
form, then it is no longer the essence. Then how does a 
copy ever copy that which does not have form? This is 
what Heidegger criticizes in Plato’s model and leads 
him to add the essence of the essence. Plato tries to 
escape the question by pointing out the example of the 
bed in The Republic; if there are two ideas of the bed, 
Plato says, then a third would still appear from behind 
and would be the idea of former two. Since this would 
go to infinitum as such, decides Plato, there can only 
be one idea of the bed. This is why it is said that 
Plato is economical. He has established an analogy that 
seemingly applies to all things, all things that are  
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said to be models are in the same relation to the 
things said to be copies. Whereas the relation of the 
Idea (as essence) to its faithful Copy, cannot be the 
same as the relation of the faithful Copy to the thing 
that seemingly copies the copy. Analogy disregards 
difference amongst what it encompasses as its modules, 
it may be said that Baudrillard takes Plato’s analogy 
for granted. Another approach to Plato’s notion of 
Idea, ‘Eidos’, could be that it shows us our inability 
to think without forms and could lead to the 
denouncement of any kind of transcendental realm or 
anything related to it. Then, the appearing of a third 
bed behind the first two as their essence and yet a 
fourth behind them and so on would only show that these 
things can not be the essence and are able to forever 
multiply within themselves. They can be considered as 
nothing else but simulacra, the whole world is and has 
always been nothing else than a perfect simulacrum with 
no origin whatsoever. In this case, there would have 
never been any Real at any time, therefore it is 
meaningless to claim as Baudrillard does, that we no 
longer have access to the Real since there wasn’t any 
to begin with. 
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3. SIMULACRA AS PURE APPEREANCE 
 
3.1. Massumi: Replicants 
 
Massumi’s e-published article on the simulacrum Realer 
Than Real begins with a short summary of Baudrillard’s 
Simulations, of which he later entitles “one long 
lament”. According to Baudrillard’s simultaneously 
apocalyptic and doomed vision of the world, we can do 
nothing else but hopelessly inhale “an ether of images” 
that are floating around aimlessly, left with no 
connection to the real whatsoever. Images are 
interchangeable, meaning has imploded thus is out of 
reach and we have no other option, according to 
Baudrillard, than to gasp in fascination, speechlessly, 
as we function as the ground to all the scenery. “We do 
not act, but neither do we merely receive. We absorb 
through our open eyes and mouths. We neutralize the 
play of energized images in the mass entropy of the 
silent majority” writes Massumi to make the 
Baudrillardian scene clearer than ever. Although 
Massumi does not disagree with Baudrillard about the 
circumstances, and even rather enjoys most of the 
depictions, he is radically critical about the attitude  
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and pessimism. “It makes for a fun read. But do we 
really have no other choice than being a naive realist 
or being a sponge?” he asks and proceeds by stating 
that Deleuze and Guattari have opened a third way;  
 
“Although it is never developed at length 
in any one place, a theory of simulation 
can be extracted from their work that can 
give us a start in analyzing our cultural 
condition under late capitalism without 
landing us back with the dinosaurs or 
launching us into hypercynicism” 
(Massumi, Realer Than Real). 
 
The third way that Massumi mentions has implications in 
almost all of Deleuze’s work and could take several 
different names of which some are ‘Overturning 
Platonism’, ‘Eternal Return’, ‘Drawing Lines Of Flight’ 
and the ‘Power of the False.’ It is more of an 
incessant project than the revolution it implies. 
Massumi states that he prefers to call it ‘Positive 
Simulation.’ He starts mapping out Deleuze and 
Guattari’s positive theory of simulation by underlining 
the emphasis Deleuze gives to the simulacrum in Plato 
and The Simulacrum: “The simulacrum is not simply a 
false copy, it places in question the very notions of 
copy and model” (Deleuze, Logic Of Sense 256). As to be 
mentioned in detail shortly, according to Deleuze the 
simulacrum has only a likeness to the model which is 
merely a surface effect, an illusion and it lacks the 
intrinsic resemblance, the sameness established by the  
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copy. Massumi adds in Realer Than Real that the inner 
dynamics of the copy and simulacrum and the process of 
their production are entirely different. 
 
“It is that masked difference, not the 
manifest resemblance, that produces the 
effect of uncanniness so often associated 
with the simulacrum. A copy is made in 
order to stand in for its model. A 
simulacrum has a different agenda, it 
enters different circuits. Pop Art is the 
example Deleuze uses for simulacra that 
have successfully broken out of the copy 
mold: the multiplied, stylized images 
take on a life of their own. The thrust 
of the process is not to become an 
equivalent of the "model" but to turn 
against it and its world in order to open 
a new space for the simulacrum's own mad 
proliferation. The simulacrum affirms its 
own difference. It is not an implosion, 
but a differentiation; it is an index not 
of absolute proximity, but of galactic 
distances.”  
 
 
Massumi further explains that the resemblance of the 
simulacrum is a means, not an end, and quotes from 
Deleuze and Guattari,  
 
“In order to become apparent, [the 
simulacrum] is forced to simulate 
structural states and slip into states of 
forces that serve it as masks. 
[…] Underneath the mask and by means of 
it, it already invests the terminal forms 
and the specific higher states whose 
integrity it will subsequently establish” 
(Anti-Oedipus 91). 
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There are two immediately very important points put 
forth in these quotes, in the later; unlike 
Baudrillard’s claim of simulacra being aimless and 
random, Deleuze and Guattari actually state that 
simulacra have a purpose, or function; “to establish 
the integrity of specific higher states.” This crucial 
point will be discussed in a later chapter. The 
important claim made by Massumi is that the very action 
of “slip[ping] into states of forces” with an intention 
totally different than what it seems to be, tells us 
Massumi, is mimicry. Massumi’s usage of ‘mimesis’ is 
important as it shows how the simulacrum actually 
performs its act of resemblance. How can something 
resemble externally and not internally? Furthermore, 
how can something perform an act of resembling without 
referring to the thing being resembled? Massumi reminds 
us that mimicry is camouflage and the same principle of 
using resemblance not to be ‘same’ (meld with vegetable 
state) but only to be ‘like’ (as-if-vegetable) in order 
to enter a higher realm (predatory animal warfare) is 
the same in nature. He continues, “It 
[mimicry/camouflage] constitutes a war zone. There is a 
power inherent in the false: the positive power of 
ruse, the power to gain a strategic advantage by 
masking one's life force.” The ultimate enemy in this 
war of ruse, Massumi says, is the so-called model 
itself. He exemplifies the replicants in Blade Runner  
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(Ridley Scott, 1982), who return to Earth for the 
purpose of undoing their pre-programmed deaths in order 
to live full lives of their own, “on their own terms”, 
not to blend with the human population but have a life 
like humans. Massumi marks a cue by the dominant 
replicant Roy Batty (Rutger Hauer), uttered while he is 
about to break the neck of the bio-engineer who made 
his NS-7 eyes, as being a “general formula for 
simulation”; “If only you could see what I have seen 
with your eyes.”  
 
Massumi quotes Alliez and Feher’s observation that the 
best weapon against the simulacrum is not to unmask it 
as a false copy, but to force it to be a true one, 
“thereby resubmitting it to representation and the 
mastery of the model.” The replicant making company in 
Blade Runner, Tyrell Corporations, had implanted actual 
human memories in a second generation NS-7 replicant, 
Rachel (Sean Young). Because of the very humanly 
implanted memories of her childhood to remind her of 
her human past, Rachel did not know she was a 
replicant, and it took Deckard (Harrison Ford) quite 
some time on the Voight-Kampff Test to determine that 
she was a fake and not an original. The Blade Runner 
example could even be taken further than what Massumi 
says, as Deckard himself is strongly implied to be a 
replicant at the end of the film, making him a  
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simulacrum so faithful to the original that he actually 
goes out to kill his own kind out of the belief in his 
own originality. 
 
Massumi returns to the question of simulation and 
reality by referring to Deleuze and Guattari in Anti-
Oedipus; they say that simulation does not replace 
reality but affirms and produces reality. It is more 
than real. Massumi claims that simulation creates the 
entire network of resemblance and that both copy and 
model are the products of the same process. “Reality is 
nothing but a well-tempered harmony of simulation.” So 
we are left with nothing but two modes of simulation; 
one that affirms the entire system, building it up and 
reproducing it over and over again. This mode of 
simulation is selective and is called ‘reality’ in 
general. The other mode, says Massumi, turns against 
the current system and is distributive rather than 
selective, it multiplies potentials and is, in general, 
called ‘art.’ This is why Deleuze and Guattari insist 
on the collective nature of becoming, says Massumi, 
because revolutionary (or minor) artists draw in all 
the powers of the false their community has to offer 
and inject it back into society as a simulation. 
 
The conclusion that Massumi draws to in Realer Than 
Real is that since we were simulacra all along and are  
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now at the moment of the dissolution of old 
territories, now that objects, images and information 
is unleashing itself as never before, this 
deterritorialization may be forced with the power of 
the false to the point of “shattering representation 
once and for all” and reterritorializing as a new 
positive simulation of the highest degree. 
 
Massumi’s way of seeing things is much more preferable 
than Baudrillard’s, but it seems to me that the whole 
point of this article is to establish a distance 
between himself and Baudrillard, they are in fact very 
close to one another at the core of their arguments. 
Similarly to Baudrillard, Massumi takes other 
appearances as the model, as in the replicant example 
in Blade Runner in order to show how a simulacrum is at 
war with “its own model.” Massumi seems to be saying 
that humans are the models of replicants, therefore the 
ultimate enemy. This is a misunderstanding of Deleuze 
as it takes the Platonic analogy seriously as 
Baudrillard does, confusing models with copies. It is 
extremely important at this point to note that in the 
example of the replicant the original that is 
undermined is not human beings themselves (not 
replicants going out to kill humans), it is whatever 
makes human or what it is that gives human its quality 
of being unique. Human beings are only copies of this  
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original and replicants are what at first sight seem to 
be copying the copy. With the emergence of replicants 
that want a life of their own, our own relation of what 
we have established as the essence of human life is 
destabilized and forced to deterritorialize. 
Furthermore, as we shall see in Deleuze, the model of 
the simulacrum is not the copy, not even the model to 
that copy, but something entirely different. Massumi 
states this himself yet fails to be loyal to Deleuze 
while putting forth his own examples. 
 
Massumi takes Baudrillard one step further while he is 
introducing the essential elements in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s thought, but, relaying on A Thousand 
Plateaus, his conclusion strays away from the 
representation/simulacrum or root/rhizome relationship 
(3-25). It is not possible to “shatter representation” 
as Massumi says, we can never do away with 
representation. In the very beginning of A Thousand 
Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari show how there are 
hierarchic structures in rhizomes, and rhizomic ones in 
hierarchies. The two rely on one another; it might be 
true that in Deleuze’ philosophy the simulacrum has two 
modes, one that serves as the copy and the other as the 
paradoxical simulacrum, or that what we know as real is 
only “a harmony of simulation” as Massumi puts it, yet 
this whole system is no more productive than Plato’s. 
If the act of the simulacrum’s resembling is, as 
 35
Massumi says, operated through mimicry, how are new 
values established? How are we to think of difference 
in such a system since signs refer to only one another 
as either affirming or negating? And since art is so 
important to this theory, what exactly is art? 
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3.2. DELEUZE: PARADOXA AND MAD BECOMING 
 
In the very beginning of “Plato and The Simulacrum”, 
the first appendix of The Logic of Sense, Deleuze asks 
what Nietzsche really means by ‘Overturning Platonism’ 
as it could not be the already taken up project by Kant 
and Hegel of “denunciating essences and appearances” 
(253). Deleuze underlines that the distinction Plato 
makes between finite, ‘hot’ and infinite, ‘hotter’ 
things is not between the Idea and the copy, but 
between the appearances themselves; copies and 
simulacra. The distinction takes place between 
material, this-worldly pretenders who all have a claim 
to the Idea. Deleuze gives the example of the lover in 
Platos’s Phaedrus, “the method of selection”, says 
Deleuze, “is not one of dividing genus into species but 
of selecting lineages”.  
““A simulacrum is an image that does not 
resemble; the image is maintained whereas 
the resemblance is lost. It does not have 
an internal relationship to a model but 
only an external relationship built on  
 
the model of the Other from which there 
flows an internalized dissemblance.” 
[…]the Platonic dialectic is neither a 
dialectic of contradiction nor of 
contrariety, but a dialect of rivalry, a 
dialectic of rivals and suitors. The 
essence of division does not appear in 
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its breadth, in the determination of the 
species of a genus, but in the depth, in 
the selection of lineage. It is to screen 
the claims and to distinguish the true 
pretender from the false one” (Logic Of 
Sense 254, 258). 
 
While the copy has an intrinsic, internal link to the 
Idea and is faithful at representing it, simulacrum has 
-some how- escaped from it's bound and acts as a mad 
element, moving paradoxically at both directions at 
once. Paradox is of great importance here; it is that 
which affirms the dualistic directions (hot/cold) 
mapped out by the realm of measurable and static things 
simultaneously (hotter). All this, needless to say, is 
a great threat to the model/copy relationship, for the 
copy is that which claims its link to the model. 
Simulacra are also claimants, but they simulate with 
intrinsic dissemblance, and become the father, fiancée 
and lover all at once, putting the whole relation, 
continuously, in jeopardy. It would not be a threat if 
it had no claim to the model in Plato's lineage, 
however far it may be from the ‘Truth’ it has to enter 
the line of representation to become a threat as the 
‘False.’ The reason why Deleuze says the simulacrum 
avoids both the model and the copy is that the way it 
makes its claims are from multiple directions at once. 
Just like the sophist, the simulacrum takes its place 
in the lineage only to make the claim from somewhere 
else, again and again. This is why it meets all the  
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formal, extrinsic elements necessary, because it 
becomes a figure only to vanish again, only in it’s 
passing to another form. This paradoxical movement is 
the reason why it lacks the internal resemblance and 
the reason why, as Baudrillard has also stated, it 
undermines the internal resemblance of the copy to the 
model altogether; images do not hide anything behind 
them. Through the simulacrum it is possible to see that 
all copies are nothing other than what Massumi calls 
“forced to believe” simulacra. At some point in their 
mad becoming, they have for some reason, decided to be.  
 
Deleuze’s understanding of Nietzsche’s ‘Overturning 
Platonism’ is not a simple ‘End of Metaphysics’ project 
aiming at shattering all dualities. Neither is it a 
‘Counter-Platonism’ that simply switches the 
hierarchical position in favour of the degraded 
opposition as Massumi tends to present. It is 
extracting the category of the false from Plato’s 
theory of the Same and the Similar (copies producing 
copies) and affirming the simulacrums rise and claiming 
its rights among copies and models. In Deleuze, 
simulacra does not murder and take the place of reality 
as in Baudrillard nor is it in a life and death war 
with the model as in Massumi. Both of these views 
presume that the operations of representation and 
simulation are different from one another; they place  
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the simulacrum in an exterior relation to the model and 
copy and posit a certain hierarchy which makes no 
difference. In contrast, Deleuze shows us how the 
simulacrum is in operation as an aggressive element 
within representation, not against the established 
system from outside but from within it. This does not 
mean that Deleuze appropriates one of the hierarchic 
views in Baudrillard; that of representation enveloping 
simulation, it is rather that the Same and Similar are 
two forces of the machine of representation, which 
itself produces only simulation. Simulacra have a 
crucial role in the system of representation as they 
establish indexical, faithful relations to the model 
(as copies) and on the other hand put the whole 
relation in jeopardy by showing that the relation is 
not one of the Same but of Similar. Simulacra has an 
affirmative and productive role, for it denies that 
appearances, whether good or not cannot be categorized 
according to the primacy of an original over them. On 
the other hand, it is true that the model has a primacy 
over the copy. “What needs a foundation, in fact, is 
always a pretension or a claim” states Deleuze (Logic 
of Sense 255). He refers to Derrida's notion of 
Father/Son to better describe the relation. To give an 
over-simplified summary, in Of Grammatology, Derrida 
describes what he calls the “Logic Of The Supplement”; 
the Father/Son, Mythos/Logos, spoken word/writing or  
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Model/Copy relationship as one in which the son has to 
precede the father in order for the father to become 
father. In this sense, the son is “originary” to the 
father. The supplement of the father; the son, is 
therefore both secondary and primary to the father. His 
example of masturbation in Of Grammatology shows how 
there is a certain lack in our nature that is corrected 
and at the same time perfected by masturbation (153). 
Derrida says it is “undecidable” whether the supplement 
is “accretion or substitution”, it is both at once 
(144). According to Deleuze, the claim of the pretender 
(the copy, the son or supplement in Derrida) grounds 
the foundation, and therefore copies are in a sense 
“originary” to models whereas simulacra make their 
claim “against the father”, with no loyalty to their 
model (Derrida qtd. in Logic of Sense 257). To further 
the discussion around Derrida’s ‘Logic of the 
Supplement’ with relation to Deleuze’s simulacrum 
relationship; it could be said that what Derrida calls 
the undecidability of the supplement is valid in the 
simulacrum, the simulacrum which seemingly has a single 
mask (the ‘loyal son') claims to have the same face as 
the father and is thought to be a coherent part of the 
originality and unity of the model. The simulacrum that 
shows yet another mask infinitely under the one 
resembling the father (the ‘bastard son’) puts the 
models unity and uniqueness in danger, it is an  
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extension, a supplement that shows the lack of the 
model to express itself for itself. These are not two 
kinds of different things says Deleuze, but “the two 
halves of a single division” (Logic Of Sense 257). 
 
Being simulated as the Same or Similar can not have a 
hierarchical superiority since they are both 
simulation. The aim of representation understood as 
aiming to establishing a truthful indexical relation, 
simulation should be exteriorized. Plato clearly states 
and defends himself of doing so; the simulacrum should 
be buried deep in the ground or “shut up in a cavern at 
the bottom of the Ocean”, what Deleuze, via Nietzsche, 
defends and celebrates is that “it always comes back 
from the abyss” (Logic of Sense 259). Deleuze 
summarizes the aim of Platonism as to impose a limit on 
the “maddening” becoming of the Simulacrum, to try to 
exteriorize it from the system of representation. It is 
possible to state that both Baudrillard and Massumi’s 
suggestions are within the Platonic system of 
representation; the first because simulacra are seen as 
copies of copies and the second for the reason that the 
model of the simulacrum is taken as the same model of 
the copy, whereas Deleuze says the simulacrum’s model 
is the other. Both Baudrillard and Deleuze lead to a 
closed system of references which could be interpreted 
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as either utopic or dystopic, making no difference, as 
shall be discussed by Durham.  
 
There is a demonic power in the simulacrum says 
Deleuze, God made man in his image and resemblance, 
through sin man has lost the resemblance while 
maintaining the image. We have become simulacrum and if 
we still have a model, this model is not that of the 
Same, claims Deleuze, “it is of the Other” and he 
further remarks that “it is not enough to invoke a 
model of the Other, for no model can resist the vertigo 
of the simulacrum” (Logic of Sense 262). 
 
How are we to understand this? What is this extreme 
difference that Deleuze calls the ‘Other’? This other 
is the same as when Deleuze and Guattari say ‘Becoming 
Animal’ in A Thousand Plateaus, or rather just by 
itself ‘becoming’ as to become something else is to 
loose oneself and experience what one can not be in the 
borders of the identical self under the system of the 
Same. In another jargon this absolute difference is 
called the Unthought. When we put the relation in this 
way, it is necessary to understand what Deleuze thinks 
of difference. 
 
“It seems that it [difference] can only 
become thinkable only when tamed – in 
other words, when subject to the four  
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iron collars of representation; identity 
in the concept, opposition in the 
predicate, analogy in judgement and 
resemblance in perception. As Foucault 
has shown, the classical world of 
representation is defined by these four 
dimensions which co-ordinate and measure 
it. […] Every other difference, every 
difference that is not rooted in this 
way, is a unbounded, uncoordinated and 
inorganic difference: too large or too 
small, not only to be thought but to 
exist”(Difference and Repetition 262). 
 
 
 
In Deleuze’s philosophy, mere representation (sign-
signified relation), figurativeness and dialectics have 
to be fought against for the reason that they claim to 
correspond to and encompass every difference, whether 
extremely small or large. Philosophy, science and art 
deal with difference in different ways. Deleuze’s 
philosophy of difference and repetition, as well as his 
crucial relation of the virtual and the actual are 
highly complex. Although they are at the core of his 
philosophy and essential to understand both his works 
standing in philosophy and arts and simulacra’s 
importance in his, they are beyond the aim and contours 
of this thesis and can only be roughly sketched were 
necessary in the argument of the simulacrum and arts.  
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4. FURTHER INTO NIETZSCHE’S ABYSS 
4.1. DURHAM: PHANTOM COMMUNITIES 
 
“ […]where there is talking, the world is 
like a garden to me. How sweet it is, 
that words and sound of music exist; are 
words and music not rainbows and seeming 
bridges between things eternally 
separated? […]Appearance lies most 
beautifully among the most alike; for the 
smallest gap is the most difficult to 
bridge […] Are things not given names and 
musical sounds, so that man may refresh 
himself with things? Speech is a 
beautiful foolery: with it man dances 
over all things” (Nietzsche 234). 
 
Scott Durham, unlike Massumi, does not decide between 
the views of Simulacrum as being dystopic as in 
Baudrillard or utopic as Massumi, and sometimes Deleuze 
tends to present. Instead, in Phantom Communities he 
suggests that it is undecidable about what the 
simulacrum is, as the whole discussion has its basis in 
Platonic metaphysics and therefore “the false 
opposition of the real to the virtual”(16). Durham, 
like Massumi, is quick in noting that Baudrillard’s 
view is a rather naïve one that does not take in 
consideration that the simulacrum is not a mere copy of 
the copy, and also that his theory of simulation 
doesn’t take us anywhere at all. Yet he does not 
refrain from considering the strong opposition and 
negativity put forth by Baudrillard, as well as Jameson 
and Debord. Durham states that while Baudrillard’s 
simulacra is almost always strictly related to mass 
communication and low-art, leading to the ‘prison 
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house’, pessimism and resentfulness, Deleuze’s examples 
or influences are always in the field of high-art, 
which are somewhat liberating, almost always highly 
playful and affirmative. At this point Durham ties the 
points of view of these philosophers looking at the 
same, yet seeing two seemingly very different things to 
the two stages of Eternal Return of Zarathustra 
(Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra). The first stage of 
the Eternal Return as “the condemnation of subject to 
the repetition of an empty self-identity, as the 
nauseating inevitability” is Baudrillard’s stage of the 
simulacrum, where the memory of a now unreachable Real 
haunts the subject in a prison-world of repeating 
appearances that have lost their link to their original 
(Durham 11). Zarathustra falls sick and hopeless in 
this stage, it is at the second moment of the Eternal 
Return when the “unfounding of appearances and the 
dissolution of the world of simulacra” are the most 
joyful and positive events (Durham 12). It is at the 
second stage when the actor or artist discovers he is 
no longer subject to morals or another favourite 
Nietzsche term, gravity. Needless to say, this is the  
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Deleuzean side of the Simulacrum. These two appearances 
of the simulacrum can be interpreted as Nietzsche’s 
“smallest gap” which is the most difficult to bridge. 
Art, like speech, is the beautiful foolery which seems 
to establish “rainbows and seemingly bridges” between 
the two separate forces of the simulacrum.  
 
Durham’s concern, as he repeatedly states in Phantom 
Communities is not so much “what the simulacrum is but 
what it can do.” He claims that postmodern art “is 
confronted with a singular dilemma: that of 
articulating the experience of a deterritorialized 
humanity” (186). Human desire, memory, dreams and 
perception continue to exist, but have all been 
exteriorized, we are not so sure that our desire is our 
own or if the experience is our selves because the very 
codes of such things are presented to us as being 
transpersonal. They are continuously articulated and 
invented in mass media and institutional spaces as 
productive and performative uses of imagination, desire 
and memory. Up to this point, this is what Baudrillard 
and Deleuze together with many others are saying 
anyway, Durham also adds that the new culture of 
simulacrum opens up new potentials for forms of 
individual and collective subjectivity that is in 
itself an undeniable utopian promise that gives us all 
the tools to produce reality without having to refer to 
an already acclaimed foundation. The problem is, 
according to Durham, that we don’t feel that the 
possibilities are our own, “it is as if another 
humanity were being created in our absence, a humanity 
whose transformations could be conceived only in the 
displaced form of a spectacle from which we are 
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irremediably excluded” (187). The tension between 
virtual and actual, as well as the resonance, has 
become unbearable as culture has concentrated and 
established itself upon the separator and connector of 
the two; the spectacle, or the screen. This surface is 
the domain of the simulacrum that as we have seen 
before, continuously slides around, mostly avoiding to 
permanently attach itself with any foundation and at 
other times grounding the foundation itself. Since we 
ourselves are mostly creatures of the actual, we feel 
isolated compared to the colourful immobile nonspace of 
the imagesphere. Durham points out primarily three 
important artists in Phantom Communities that have 
interpreted postmodernity according to the 
characterizing strain between the virtual and the 
actual. The first is J.G. Ballard who is mostly taken 
as a somewhat Baudrillardean example. In the dystopic 
world of The Crash, “it is the private fantasy of 
Ballard’s suicidal consumer-hero to break violently 
through the screen that separates the inferior spaces 
of consumption from the nonspace inhabited by his or  
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her simulacral doubles.” The second artist/author is 
Pierre Klossowski who is seen to be more on the utopian 
side of Deleuze’s simulacrum. Klossowski’s attempt and 
desire at constructing a “purely virtual subjectivity 
that would refer to no existence outside the screen 
itself” is, however philosophically and aesthetically 
appealing it may be, no less problematic than the 
apocalyptic view. 
 
“What remains unthinkable in both of 
these myths is the possibility of passage 
between the virtual and the actual in the 
postmodern world; neither Klossowski nor 
Ballard problematize the structural 
separation of the virtual subjectivities 
figured in the imagesphere from the 
vestigial subjects who are reduced to 
merely consuming those images as 
spectacle” (Durham 189). 
 
The third artist is Jean Genet, which seems to be the 
perfect example for Durham’s own propositions. 
According to Durham, Genet is not concerned with 
finding a solution for the postmodern situation or 
elaborating a world view in which the spectacle might 
be grasped in its totality. In this sense, says Durham, 
“Genet’s appropriations of the simulacral image are not 
ideological or metaphysical, but pragmatic.” He says in 
Phantom Communities that Genet is interested not in 
what the simulacrum is, but what it may become. 
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“What forces of attraction and repulsion, 
of domination and resistance, are 
mobilized in the serial image? What are 
the actual and potential effects of its 
variations and metamorphoses from one 
moment of the series to the next? These 
questions constitute the point of 
departure for all of Genet’s writings […] 
where the spectacle comes to transgress 
its own limits: where the virtual and the 
actual, the spectacle and the spectator, 
the dominant and the emergent pass into 
one another, as divergent expressions of 
the same power of the false” (190). 
 
Genet’s fictions, claims Durham, order the relations of 
power and desire that they map and shape the forms of 
life that they express. The question is, according to 
Durham; to what extent can the elements and relations 
in the dominant be transformed through their repetition 
in and as fictions? Durham says that Genet uses the 
potential of becoming other than himself to the degree 
that he is “dying to himself”, what more, the images 
and narratives that he produces (because they are in a 
weaving act, a continuous movement between the various 
actual and virtual worlds) are not in isolation (as is 
in the case of Klossowski) but transpersonal and 
collective. 
 
Durham’s main concern throughout Phantom Communities is 
to find a possible way through which Deleuze’s 
simulacrum can be integrated in narrative. Or to put it 
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in a better way, Durham says that collective narrative 
in itself is the ultimate desire and need of the 
postmodern culture which without would not be possible 
to think of postmodernity in the first place. And, 
since postmodern culture is shaped by the simulacrum, 
how could these two things; narration and the 
simulacrum, come together, especially if we consider 
how the simulacrum itself poses a serious problem in 
the context of narration. Above all, Durham needs to 
“find an aesthetic, political and ethical potential” in 
the simulacrum (5). 
 
Durham’s critiques and understanding of the simulacrum 
is important, first of all because while appropriating 
Deleuze’s view of the simulacrum he does not 
underestimate the importance of the unthought and 
unthinkable and secondly, his views are relevant 
because there really is gap between the possibilities 
granted to simulacra in theory which have no or very 
little correspondence in practice. Nevertheless, he 
does not succeed in convincing that his personal hero 
Genet is the example of the perfect use of the 
simulacrum. If for nothing else, only because he makes 
an example out of Genet, whereas the simulacrum is 
supposed to be the mask of difference. It is 
continuously stated in celebratory postmodern texts 
that there opens up an infinite number of possibilities 
of “figures who live at the limit of the difference  
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[…], the borders of the actual and virtual” who with 
their sole existence bring into question the dualities 
and truth relations, rendering the conventional roles 
as nothing more than roles (175). But the possibilities 
and the ‘difference’ just doesn’t open up, it is as if 
the mask of difference hides and holds only the 
transsexual or the cyborg. Durham is no exception and 
after he glorifies the transsexual, as done millions of 
times before, he can not find additional roles and or 
masks although he strives for it. The same critique 
could be made of Deleuze himself and although Durham 
does point out a certain confusion with what to do with 
Deleuze’s simulacrum as well as the formal elements of 
art that Deleuze tends to avoid, it could not be said 
that his theory or examples do not add anything to 
Deleuze’s views of the simulacrum except for the danger 
that it may be thought to be utopic. The ‘shattering of 
representation’ is not murdering the mirror of 
representation, it is truly shattering it in to small 
pieces (with a hammer perhaps) so that we see it is a 
mirror of similarity and not sameness. 
 
In the following chapter I will try to analyze the two 
movements of the simulacrum within visual works of art 
while considering Durham’s critique of Deleuze and also 
further discuss Deleuze’s notion of art. 
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4.2. SIMULACRA AT WORK 
 
“within painting, Pop Art pushed the 
copy, copy of the copy, etc., to the 
extreme point at which it reverses and 
becomes a simulacrum (such as Warhol’s 
remarkable ‘serial’ series, in which all 
the repetitions of habit, memory and 
death are conjugated)” (Difference and 
Repetition, 293-294). 
 
As stated before, Plato’s understanding of art, 
especially painting or tragedy is limited to imitation 
leading to the understanding of simulacra as only a 
degraded or false copy of a copy. In Book III of The 
Republic, there is a point where he asks “… and what 
about the painter? I would like to know whether he may 
be thought to imitate that which originally exists in 
nature, or only the creations of artists?” Of course, 
the answer is the later, and the only piece of evidence 
or justification is yet again an analogical one; that 
although we see a bed from only one angle in time, we 
know that a bed does not change in reality even though 
it may seem to be different from different fixed points 
of view, including the one in a painting. The answer is 
most unsatisfying, it still leaves the possibility that 
painting may be not imitating the copy but the model, 
or maybe even something else, or performing something  
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totally different in its gesture of imitation. Of 
course, in a different way and with a totally different 
agenda than the copy does. It is a general claim today 
that we have long gone beyond this understanding of the 
arts as mere imitation by replacing the word with 
representation. As stated before, except for granting 
painting and tragedy the right to exist for and within 
itself, it seems to me that our act of going beyond 
Plato is nothing else but simply jumping over, leaving 
the problem as it is. This is especially true if we 
consider Deleuze’s objections to the generally claimed 
notion that painting was historically a form of 
documentation/imitation that had to abandon this 
quality with the introduction of the superior form of 
precise documentation and figuration; photography, and 
open a new field within itself; the abstract. The 
important point here is that thinking of painting and 
photography in similar terms is the same mentality in 
Plato that gives painting the quality of copying 
appearances, being figurative, whereas Deleuze claims 
that painting has never had the sole intention of 
representing the thing or the story anyway. He gives 
the example of El Greco’s The Burial of the Count of 
Orgasz, (fig.1) where there is a narration of the 
burial in the lower half of the painting yet in the 
upper part the figures are freed from being 
representative, narrative or figurative. 
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Fig. 1. “Burial of the Count of Orgasz,” El Greco.  
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“With God –but also with Christ, the Virgin, and even 
Hell— lines, colours, and movements are freed from the 
demands of representation. The Figures are lifted up, 
or doubled over, or contorted, freed from all 
figuration. They no longer have anything to represent 
or narrate, since in this domain they are content to 
refer to the existing code of the Church. Thus in 
themselves, they no longer have to do with anything but 
“sensations”, celestial, infernal, or terrestrial 
sensations. Everything is made to pass through the 
code, the religious sentiment is painted in all the 
colours of the world. One must not say, “If God does 
not exist, everything is permitted.” It is just the 
opposite” (Francis Bacon, 9). 
 
As is clearly seen in the quotation, according to 
Deleuze, what painting deals with, together with all art, 
is sensations. In all arts the concern is not inventing 
or reproducing new forms but of capturing forces, for 
this reason Deleuze claims that no art is figurative 
(Francis Bacon 34). Furthermore, in the Eleventh Chapter 
of the same book, Deleuze says that the false figurative 
belief follows from the mistake of thinking that a 
painter works on a white surface. The painter, says 
Deleuze, already has many things in his studio around him 
and even more in his head. It does not make an important 
difference if these things are virtual or actual, they 
are all already present in the canvas. If the canvas had 
been an empty white surface, the painter would have been 
in the position of reproducing an object functioning as a  
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model in front of him, thus filling the canvas with 
paint, whereas his position is one of cleaning, clearing, 
emptying the canvas from the already present images, with 
paint. “[…] he paints on images that are already there in 
order to produce a canvas whose functioning will reverse 
the relations between the model and copy” (Francis Bacon 
49). Although later in What is Philosophy? Deleuze 
together with Guattari will write that art does not need 
a viewer, not even the artist, in The Logic of Sensation 
Deleuze admits that “figuration exists, it is a fact, and 
it is even a prerequisite of painting.” Figuration is 
there in the canvas, in forms of what Deleuze calls 
‘clichés’. In several points throughout Francis Bacon, 
Deleuze manifests a certain dislike towards what he calls 
“art still to intellectual.” It is possible to only 
transform, mutilate or manipulate the already existing 
cliché, but for Deleuze this is too intellectual and 
abstract and it gives way for the cliché to rise from its 
ashes leaving the artist at its utmost to parody and 
nothing more. Although Deleuze only quotes D.H. 
Lawrence’s passage over Cézanne as an example of fighting 
against the cliché and resurrecting it in most cases, it 
is possible to give numerous examples for the notion at 
stake, including but not limited to Cubism, Suprematism, 
Minimalism, Action Painting (but not colour-field 
painting), Photo Realism, Pop-Art and all so-called 
Conceptual Art. Of course it is not possible to decide 
and generalize in the way I have just have for undoubtly 
all of the work of the artists in these categories have 
sensational qualities, it is just as unavoidable as the 
figurative. What is at stake is more about the way that 
such works ‘work’, they deal with decomposing and 
recomposing effects, as Deleuze refers to, which only 
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transforms the clichés at hand, just to show the 
clichéness of the cliché. In a sense, this is the usage 
of the simulacrum as a negating destructive element, it 
is the lesser side of Deconstruction. Certain surface 
qualities are mimed or repeated (it is severely important 
to be repeated) with an element of difference and not 
sameness. This movement puts the relation of the 
‘original’ copy to the original into jeopardy, what was 
covered before is made explicit and the former meaning 
dissolves, or is forced to change slightly. A good and 
clear example would be the early Untitled Film Stills 
(1980) of Cindy Sherman, (fig.2) in which “Sherman has 
manufactured a series of masks of herself based on 
current myths, stereotypes and images of women, 
deconstructing as it were, each female character she 
assumes, [… ]masquerading her various ‘selves’ through 
mocking photographic scenarios, she makes us aware that 
these are not just images of women but signs of 
difference, markers or templates of masculinity” (Honour 
& Fleming, 875). Sherman, by miming mass-produced images 
of female characters in these series, makes a critique to  
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Fig.2. “Untitled Film Still No. 13,” Cindy Sherman. 
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that distribution by forcing herself a simulacral image. 
Although her posture and the settings in the photographs 
are similar, although she has an extrinsic likeness to 
the models and actresses in films and magazines, she is 
not. We know she is not. Sherman’s Untitled Film Series 
therefore decompose and recompose the cliché, parodying 
the copies of which are female figures in mainstream 
cinema. 
 
Another example would be Vincent Leo’s black and white 
photographs in the 80’s which “upon first examination “[… 
] look like pastiches of the photographs of Robert Frank. 
In fact –and here Leo’s work separates itself resolutely 
from the realm of academic pasticheur- they are the 
photographs of Robert Frank. What Leo has done is to cut 
up the reproductions, [… ]reposition and collage them, 
and re-photograph the results to yield (in Marchel 
Duchamp’s words) “a new thought for that object”” 
(Solomon-Godeau, 82-83). 
 
 Although the examples are taken from photography, and 
seem to be directly linked with postmodernism, there is 
no reason to think this is specific to the discipline 
or era, rather; together with photography and the 
explosion of imagery this aspect of all arts have 
become clearer. What Deleuze claims of the simulacrum, 
whether we like it or not, is no doubt at work in these 
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examples and they achieve all that is said of the 
simulacrum in The Logic of Sense. The only visual 
example I have ever encountered in Deleuze and/or 
Guattari of the simulacrum ‘at work’ is that of Andy 
Warhol’s pop Marilyn series, (fig.3) which is precisely 
the same in its elements and movements as the examples 
given above. This usage or aspect of the simulacrum 
seems to be very close to what Debord calls 
“détournement” in Methods of Détournement, it is also 
accompanied by a certain belief or attitude of “leaving 
formal representation behind” or at least using 
representation at the minimum where only the indexical 
value remains. What has become important, in its double 
sense, is being performative. Conceptual art is the 
high point of this attitude and approach in arts, it 
has brought the image to a point where visual art comes 
as close as it can to words. In What Is Philosophy? 
Deleuze and Guattari write “the plan of composition 
tends to become informative, and the sensation depends 
upon the simple “opinion” of Conceptual Art. 
 
In their final book written together in 1994, Deleuze 
and Guattari take up a definition of art that is 
historically persistent instead of being era specific. 
Because What Is Philosophy? is more of a “book of 
philosophy as a practice of the creation of concepts” 
it is at times somewhat difficult to relate it to 
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Fig. 3. “First Marilyns,” Andy Warhol. 
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Deleuze’s former, ‘more philosophical’ work (What Is 
Philosophy? Translators’ Introduction, vii).  
 
 “The young man will smile on the canvas 
for as long as the canvas lasts. Blood 
throbs under the skin of this woman’s 
face, the wind shakes a branch, a group 
of men prepare to leave. In a novel or a 
film, the young man will stop smiling, 
but he will start to smile again when we 
turn to this page or that moment. Art 
preserves, and it is the only thing in 
the world that is preserved. It preserves 
and is preserved in itself (quid juris?), 
although actually it lasts no longer than 
its support and material-–stone, canvas, 
chemical color, and so on (quid facti). 
[…] The thing became independent of it’s 
“model” from the start…” (Deleuze & 
Guattari, What Is Philosophy? 163) 
 
 
The difficulty is apparent; formerly we have seen how 
Deleuze celebrates Warhol’s series as having pushed the 
copy to the extent that it becomes a simulacrum, which 
has proven to be nothing more than transforming the 
cliché that does not satisfy the role given to the 
simulacrum. This questions will find answers in the 
preceding pages of What Is Philosophy?, yet it is still 
difficult to relate the notion of art taken up in this 
book, to the simulacrum that has been seen as such a 
vital part of art in the context of the former texts. 
 
The artwork, according to Deleuze and Guattari, is not 
only independent from the model, but is independent of  
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the creator of the work and also the viewer. This is 
because the preserved thing (the artwork), write the 
authors, is “a bloc of sensations, that is to say, a 
compound of percepts and affects” (What Is Philosophy? 
164). Percepts are not perceptions and affects are no 
longer affections, they are independent from the state 
of the person(s) who perceive or undergoes them, 
Deleuze and Guattari further say that sensations (and 
therefore affects and percepts) are “beings whose 
validity lies in themselves and exceeds any lived” 
(What Is Philosophy? 164). Furthermore, sensations come 
to existence only in the absence of man, because they 
catch the viewer in the stone, in words, on the canvas 
and the viewer is no longer himself at that moment, he 
is becoming stone, is caught in the becoming of the 
bloc of sensations. Art is independent from the 
creator, because the only law of creation is that the 
compound must stand on its own, the greatest difficulty 
for the artist is to make the compound of sensations 
stand, that is, be preserved in itself and nothing 
else, when this is achieved the artwork no longer needs 
the creator and comes to existence alone. According to 
Deleuze and Guattari, the material is the condition of 
the percept and affect that are preserved within 
themselves. Even if the material lasts for a few 
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seconds, it gives sensation the power to exist and be 
preserved within itself, “in the eternity that coexists 
within this short duration” (What Is Philosophy 166). 
 
Art, say Deleuze and Guattari, is all about sensations; 
we paint, sculpt and write sensations with sensations. 
Percepts do not refer to objects, “if they resemble 
something it is with a resemblance produced with their 
own methods; and the smile on the canvas is made solely 
with colors, lines, shadow and light” (166). 
 
With the light of these views on art, I will be trying 
to relate Warhol’s Marilyn Series in a way that it goes 
beyond the act of being indexical and producing the 
simple sensation of recognition. Deleuze must have had 
more in mind than this. 
 
In another version of Warhol’s Marilyn Series (fig.4), 
it is possible to see what it may be that Deleuze found 
in Warhol. The application of colour on what is 
obviously a photocopy of the famous photograph, seen in 
its details, (the red of the lips ‘more’ than the lips) 
is captivating in its grotesqueness. It is hard to 
write about why this image has more sensational power 
than the previous Marilyn, yet it is my opinion that 
the secret lies in my very inability of not being able 
to make the sensational reasonably verbal. 
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Fig. 4. “Marilyn,” Andy Warhol. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
Durham and Deleuze have shown us, how the simulacrum, 
as Massumi’s replicants, can betray or be forced to 
forget their own nature of moving paradoxically and 
become representative copies, loyal to the model and 
how copies can be forced to break their chains and 
become simulacra. Under the light of the same authors, 
the simulacrum is what gives way to new meanings and 
opens up the possibility of new subjectivities by 
submitting itself in the system of representation as an 
element of difference, yet it is at times accompanied 
by a certain utopic revolutionary sound to it, as if it 
has yet to come, whereas Plato’s conception, along with 
Debord and Baudrillard’s, have projected (at the least) 
displeasing views out of the notion of simulacra as 
copies of copies that paralyze social relations as well 
as individuality, forcing us into a state of being 
subject with no possibilities of anything else. There 
is no reason to think that the situation is new, in 
either cases, the conflict between these two groups has 
its basis on trying to decide, between the virtual and 
the actual, which is in itself a quasi-supposition4 
that we need to maintain in order to think or create. 
The simulacrum reveals itself in its pure innocence, 
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which is beyond all good and evil, of truth and 
falsehood. It is the moment that simulacra stops 
becoming and transforms itself into a copy that gives 
way to new models. As Derrida shows in his logic of the 
supplement, the original needs the simulacrum to come 
about and grant itself with its originality. This is 
how old (and new) law tables are made. Such an 
understanding is the Nietzschenean ‘Overturning of 
Platonism’ itself, accomplished, yet it is important to 
note that this is not the ‘End of Metaphysics’ for the 
Ideas and Copies have/are functions that cannot be away 
with. The one thing that is made impossible is a static 
truth or good, or everlasting value. Although with the 
acceptance of the world as appearances there logically 
seems to be no place or need for the Idea or the Copy, 
(for their rein is over), they are mere ‘tools’ with 
which thought and language makes itself possible. 
Furthermore, art itself is not, and cannot be mere 
‘positive’ simulation as Massumi relying on Deleuze put 
forth. The dual movement of the simulacrum is how 
language operates and art does not make an exception to 
this, the difference of art is that through sensation 
it gives the possibility (or forces us) to become other 
than ourselves and experience what we cannot know 
through the intellect.  
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In Pierre Klossowski’s vocabulary, the word ‘phantasm’ 
and ‘simulacra’ differ from one another, the first 
“refers to an obsessional image produced instinctively 
from the life of the impulses” and the second “is a 
willed reproduction of a phantasm (in a literary, 
pictorial, or plastic form) that simulates this 
invisible agitation of the soul. The simulacrum, in its 
imitative sense, is the actualization of something in 
itself incommunicable and nonrepresentable: the 
phantasm in its obsessional constraint” (Klossowski, 
Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, Translators Preface 
x-xi).  
 
There is still a confusion in where to situate, where 
to find the simulacrum. Deleuze’s philosophy is 
productive and consistent, as far as I can see, even 
inspiring and explanatory of the sensational becoming 
in art. But where is this simulacrum? It escapes all 
forms or only disguises temporarily and when it becomes 
a copy we can no longer clearly see the simulacrum 
because it shows the thing it refers to. It’s like a 
riddle. Just because I have haunted myself with this 
riddle, ‘where is simulacra?’ I made up an answer (that 
I believe in), with the help of Pierre Klossowski,  
that would satisfy the question. 
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“How does “simulacrum” relate to all 
this? In the self-elucidating fourth 
section of Tableaux vivants: essais 
critiques 1936-1983 (2001), Klossowski 
recalls that in antique statuary, because 
it was impossible to create a soul to 
animate the simulacra of gods, the souls 
of intermediaries—that is, demons and 
angels—would be invoked and locked inside 
holy or sacred images so that these 
“idols” would thereafter have the power 
to perform good or evil deeds. Klossowski 
infers a psycho literary theory from this 
ancient custom: the emotion contained in 
a work of art —and thus provoked in the 
spectator or reader— is correlative to a 
“demonic movement.” Klossowski’s 
characters are “idols” in this literal, 
as well as ancient, sense” (Tyler). 
 
Simulacra are in the material. It is matter, that is; 
stone, clay, paint itself that has the potential of 
“demons or angels” within it. Matter becomes material 
of the simulacrum through a captivating and 
simultaneous resemblance and dissemblance. Benjamin’s 
twofold critique of mechanical reproduction is the 
outcome of the “loss of aura” in this sense; that there 
is no longer a material, spatial distance in which 
he/we can perceive the material in its gesture of 
resemblance (Benjamin 221). Samuel Weber shows how this 
is not the character of being present in space and 
time, but of mediation itself. Chemicals of photography 
and film, even of the digital light of the monitor or 
projector are not exceptions, they still have the same 
movement of everyday matter turning into phantasmal 
material through the gesture of resemblance. The  
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simulacrum, I have come to conclude, is the 
“resemblance that haunts material.” As such, it has two 
kinds of appearance. 
 
 “If resemblance haunts the work of art, 
it is because sensation refers only to 
its material; it is the percept or affect 
of the material itself, the smile of oil, 
the gesture of fired clay, the thrust of 
metal, the crouch of Romanesque stone, 
and the ascent of Gothic stone. The 
material is so varied in each case that 
it is difficult to say where in fact the 
material ends and the sensation begins” 
(Deleuze & Guattari, What Is Philosophy? 
166). 
 
The first movement of the simulacrum concentrates on 
the ‘resemblance’ and attaches itself to its model and 
becomes a copy in the platonic sense. This is true for 
almost all images in mass-production, especially 
advertisements and also eventually conceptual art and 
‘art still too intellectual’ in Deleuze’s terms. 
 
This understanding of the simulacrum is available in 
Baudrillard, Jameson, Lyotard and Debord among others. 
I have come to believe that they have taken Plato’s 
analogy (based on the belief in the power of analogy 
itself) a step too further while ignoring the 
definition of essence to the point that the original is 
understood as nothing else than again matter. Mona Lisa 
is not the original. The pepper that Edward Weston  
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Fig.5. “Pepper #30,” Edward Weston. 
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photographed in Pepper No. 30 (fig. 5) is not the 
original, and the pepper in the photograph is no longer 
a pepper. As stated before, the understanding of the 
world as appearances can lead to only Nihilism, this is 
the first step of the Eternal Return that needs to be 
negated. Resemblance haunts the material in the sense 
that it becomes a reference to something that does not 
exist or is made completely unreachable through the 
very act of the resemblance. It is a closed system, in 
theory; nothing escapes. 
 
The second movement of the simulacrum is when it 
concentrates on the ‘haunting’. Its resemblance is, 
like many of the philosophers in this study have 
pointed out, one that does look like something but is 
terrifying in the way we know it is not that thing. A 
ghost is a simulacrum, it may look exactly like our 
long-dead beloved but all we can see in ‘it’ is the 
difference, not the resemblance. It lacks the essence, 
the link or faith to the original (the essence of the 
beloved) and is a thing within itself. This is also the 
case of artworks. It doesn’t matter if we know the 
model is homosexual English painter Francis Bacon who 
is staring back at us in Self Portrait (fig.6), what 
captures us is not ‘his’ stare, but ‘its’ stare. The 
paint, brush strokes and colour, their relation with  
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Fig. 6. “Self Portrait,” Francis Bacon. 
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one another, capture and force us in to their own mad 
becoming of the flesh or the face of Bacon or Bacon.  
 
In fact, it is not even possible to say that the 
becoming is ‘becoming flesh’ for just as we are no 
longer ourselves at the moment of becoming, neither is 
the flesh. It is also not possible to directly talk of 
the experience. Pierre Klossowski describes this 
beautifully in his article on Georges Bataille. 
 
“The simulacrum is not exactly a pseudo-
notion: the latter would still serve as a 
reference point until it could be 
denounced as a false path. The simulacrum  
constitutes the sign of an instantaneous 
state and is unable to establish the 
exchange between one mind and another, 
nor permit the passage from one thought 
to another. In the aforementioned 
"discussion" and in a conference several 
years later, Bataille rightly denied 
communication because one would only ever 
communicate the residue of what one 
claims to communicate” (Klossowski, 
Bataille). 
 
 
Bataille did communicate though, in Inner Experience he 
wrote of the impossibility of communicating the 
‘mystical’ experience without origin while being 
faithful to it. One has to betray it to knowledge, 
systems of signs and codes. In this sense, the virtual 
and actual can never come together in coherence, they 
can never blend or be discussed and experienced on the 
same level. They co-exist, it is not possible to say 
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which is which because the separating lines constantly 
escape us. The actual relies on the virtual not only 
because it gives the actual the right to install itself 
as it is, but also because it is the virtual that 
brings difference through repetition into the actual, 
letting it expand; form and install new Truths, new 
Realities, new Beings, new Laws, all with a capital 
letter, new Values. This is the “higher states” Deleuze 
and Guattari describe as the aim of the simulacrum in 
Anti-Oedipus. In turn the actual supplies the virtual 
the ground to fly from and ends up destroying values.5 
Similarly, the two movements of the simulacrum; that of 
being a copy and mad paradoxical object rely on each 
other. The simulacrum needs something to haunt and turn 
into non-sense. Deleuze’s favourite example in The 
Logic of Sense is Louis Carroll’s Alice In Wonderland. 
All of the paradoxes in the book are meaningful only 
because Alice is in the threat of losing her proper 
name. Likewise, she in fact needs the experience and 
danger of losing herself to establish herself and to be 
‘Alice.’ When she finally returns to the real world 
where little girls have good sense, can recite poems 
and don’t change sizes, she returns with a “different 
face” (Nietzsche qtd. Lacoue-Labarthe 49). 
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NOTES 
1 
In that Empire, the Art of Cartography 
achieved such Perfection that the Map of 
one single Province occupied the whole of 
a City, and the Map of the Empire, the 
whole of a Province. In time, those 
Disproportionate maps failed to satisfy 
and the Schools of Cartography sketched a 
Map of the Empire which was of the size 
of the Empire and coincided at Every 
point with it. Less addicted to the study 
of Cartography, the Following Generations 
comprehended that this dilated Map was 
Useless and, Not without Impiety, 
delivered it to the Inclemencies of the 
Sun and of the Winters. In the Western 
Deserts there remain piecemeal Ruins of 
the Map, inhabited by Animals and 
Beggars. In the entire rest of the 
Country there is no vestige left of the 
Geographical Disciplines. 
 
(Borges and Casares, 123) 
 
 
It is interesting to note that the Borges story is 
about the meaninglessness of making such a map. 
 
 
2 It is not fully clear in Baudrillard if (to go on 
with the Borges analogy) the map has somehow destroyed 
the territory and there no longer exists such a thing 
as the Real, or if the map we (think we) play, work and 
live on prevents direct access to the Real. Baudrillard 
refers to both cases through out Simulacra and 
Simulation. If the former option is the case, one must 
ask how a whole realm has totally disappeared or what 
has become of it and also, since it doesn’t exist any 
longer, there is no point in longing for it. If the 
second option is true (‘true’ because Baudrillard 
claims so), then he would be following a similar line  
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of thought with Lacan’s screen and because the map was 
mediated in the first place (as a representation of the 
territory) it would have left at least the signs of its 
inability to fully represent that could still serve as 
sensational points of contact with the real. The map 
could still “gaze” back in Lacan’s term. 
 
3 I understand Deleuze when he says that the painter 
must fight with the figure in order to bring out the 
figure, because both abstraction and figurative 
painting are systems for the intellect, they do not 
effect our nervous system as Francis Bacon does. He is 
intellectually very correct, yet in my opinion, 
imitation can also be sensational. Take the example of 
Mezzoni’s Lamentation (Fig.7). Deleuze is rather 
critical of narration and sees figuration as an 
inescapable enemy that has to be fought with. 
 
4 The term “quasi-supposition” was suggested by Zafer 
Aracagök instead of the former “false pre-supposition”. 
 
5 The relations I have written on the virtual and 
actual are to find their references in Lacoue-
Labarthe’s ‘Gestell-Gestalt’ relationship in 
Typography, Derrida’s ‘Father-Son’ relation in “The 
Double Session” and in almost everything I have ever 
read in Deleuze /and Guattari. I am not referring to 
these sources directly because I can’t say where I 
exactly encountered the concept, and I may also be 
saying something different (or even wrong or exactly 
the same) than what Deleuze says in Difference and 
Repetition in particular. 
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